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Miller: Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs

Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family
Servs.
2021-Ohio-4096
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1800s, the United States of America has fostered
arguments regarding the pleading standards necessary to make a claim
within its court system.1 Most recently, these disagreements have focused
upon the appropriate implementation of three revolutionary constitutional
law decisions: Conley v. Gibson, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 In turn, each of these United States Supreme Court cases
have altered the way the U.S. looks upon and handles the standard of
pleading required in a motion to dismiss, per the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 Though each of these cases elaborate upon Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which details the general requirements of a
pleading to acquire relief, each case seems to apply a different standard than
the last.4 This creates a multitude of issues for lower courts attempting to
apply the law of the aforementioned cases.5 When it appears as though the
Supreme Court has set forth multiple, contradictory processes which
pleadings must meet, state courts are left puzzled and without the intended
guidance in choosing which precedential standard to apply.6
The Ohio judiciary is no exception.7 The state has elected to codify the
requirement that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement”
showing need for relief, an elaboration on the Conley standard.8 Though
this Ohio rule provides direction for lower courts within the state, it neglects
to acknowledge the standards set forth subsequent to Conley by the United

1. Brook Detterman, Rumors of Conley’s Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: The Impact
of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly on Pleading Standards in Environmental Litigation, 40 ENVTL.
L. 295, 300 (2010) [hereinafter, Detterman, Rumors of Conley’s Demise].
2. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.41, 45-46 (1957); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
563 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
3. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2022); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678-79.
5. Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal
and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1259 (2010) [hereinafter Mize, From Plausibility to
Clarity].
6. Id.
7. OHIO CIV. R. 8(a) (2022).
8. Id.; Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
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States Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.9 Further, because Ohio’s code
is state-specific, it may exist in contradiction to other states’ laws which, by
mandate of the United States Supreme Court, it should not.10 Instead of
complying with one, unified standard set forth by the United States
Supreme Court, both the judicial and legislative branches of the Ohio
government have been forced to cherry-pick only one of the guiding
principles from the aforementioned cases to govern.11 It is undeniable that a
solution to this issue must be reached to avoid nonuniform application of
laws and inequitable treatment of American citizens.12 However, despite
the seemingly looming threat this suggestion presents, reaching that
“solution” may be easier than it appears. Analyzed below are each of these
cases, their relationships with one another, and their potential to be utilized
appropriately and collectively within American courts.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

G.B. was a two-year-old child who resided in a volatile household
resultant of her parents’ behavior, both of whom had a history of abusing
their children.13 While living with her parents, caseworkers were assigned
to G.B. to investigate claims of neglect and conduct home visits.14 During
this time, G.B. was admitted to Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical
Center.15 Her stay at the hospital revealed she was severely malnourished
and had sustained numerous injuries.16 Doctors from the medical center
reported to G.B.’s caseworkers the possibility that she was suffering from
abuse at her home.17
Three months later, the caseworkers allegedly conducted a home visit to
G.B. in response to the previous hospital stay.18 The caseworkers reported
that G.B. was “healthy and happy” at the time of the visit.19 However, only
three weeks after the home visit occurred, G.B. was pronounced dead.20
The coroner subsequently discovered over 100 injuries upon G.B.’s body at

9. OHIO CIV. R. 8(a) (2022); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79.
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
11. OHIO CIV. R. 8(a) (2022); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
12. Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity, supra note 5, at 1260.
13. Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No.
2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 14 (2021).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at ¶ 33.
17. Id. at ¶ 14.
18. Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 33.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the time of her death and noted she weighed only 13 pounds.21 The cause of
death was decided to be “Battered Child Syndrome with Acute Chronic
Intercranial Hemorrhages and Starvation.”22
Desena Bradley, the maternal grandmother to G.B., subsequently filed
suit against the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services
(henceforth referred to as “HCJFS”) and each of G.B.’s caseworkers.23 In
the complaint, Bradley alleged caseworkers were wanton and reckless by
unreasonably failing to adequately investigate the report the hospital gave
them claiming G.B.’s likelihood of being abused.24 Bradley asserted the
“wanton and reckless” claim because such behavior was a legal exception to
the immunity that would otherwise have been granted to the defendants as
they were government employees.25
Each of the defendants named in the case at bar filed separate motions
for judgement on the pleadings, arguing the lawsuit was invalid because of
their status as government employees; they argued that, because of that
status, they enjoyed immunity from cases such as Bradley’s.26 The trial
court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting their motions.27 Bradley
appealed.28
The First District affirmed the lower court’s ruling.29 However, this
pronouncement was not made without discourse. While the First District
uniformly agreed that HCJFS was immune from the suit, not all members of
the court felt the same rationale could be applied to the caseworker
defendants.30 However, the court ultimately decided Bradley’s complaint
lacked facts sufficient to support a conclusion of a wanton or reckless
misconduct regarding their investigation of G.B.’s case.31 Again, Bradley
appealed the ruling.32 The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Bradley’s
appeal and reviewed it; that is the case at hand.33

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 5.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id.
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COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Fischer

Justice Fischer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
O’Connor and Justices Donnelly, Stewart, and Brunner.34 The Court
commences its discussion by posing the first issue in the case at bar; it
states, “[W]e are asked to decide whether claims invoking the exception
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) to the immunity afforded to employees of a
political subdivision are subject to a heightened pleading standard.”35 In
pursuit of an answer, the Court reviews the application of immunity of
government employees under Ohio law.36 Though such immunity is
generally granted, where wanton and reckless conduct by government
employees exists, the privilege dissipates.37 The Court delves further into
this exception to the immunity rule by revisiting a case it decided in 2012:
Anderson v. Massillon. In Anderson, the court defined both “wanton” and
“reckless.”38 “Wanton” delineated a failure of exercising care to an
individual to whom a duty is owed when harm is highly probable.39
“Reckless” described conduct that intentionally and unreasonably
overlooked obvious risks of harm.40
As a result of these definitions, the Supreme Court of Ohio mandated
that, for a government employee to act wantonly or recklessly, their conduct
must be beyond that of ordinary negligence.41 This elevated standard
became the crux of this case. For the wanton or reckless exception to
immunity to be applicable, behavior that is more than negligence must be
proven.42 The question now becomes whether there must also be a
heightened pleading standard.
Generally, a pleading for relief in Ohio requires only a “short and plan
statement of the claim,” dictated by Civ.R. 8(A).43 However, the Court
currently recognizes some exceptions to this rule where the pleading
standard is heightened, such as claims of fraud.44 Thus, in the case at bar,
the Court was faced with a decision of whether to treat claims of wanton
34.
35.
36.
37.
(2022).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶¶ 1, 18.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)
Anderson v. Massillon, 983 N.E.2d 266, 270-72 (Ohio 2012).
Id.
Id.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (2022).
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 10; OHIO CIV. R. 9(b) (2022).
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and reckless conduct like fraud, applying a heightened standard, or to treat
them like almost all other claims brought within the State. To make its
decision, the Court referred to codified language in the Ohio State Rules of
Civil Procedure.45 Specifically, it looked to Rule 9(B) which states,
“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally.”46 Deciding that both wanton and reckless conduct are
covered by the umbrella of this definition, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled
that the pleading standard for wanton and reckless claims would be the
general, notice-pleading described in Civ.R. 8(A).47 No heightened
pleading standard was deemed necessary.48
The Court then moves into its discussion to the second issue in the case
at hand: whether the complaint made by Ms. Bradley against the
caseworkers could survive the defendants’ motions for a judgement on the
pleadings.49 Recall, Bradley’s complaint alleges that G.B.’s caseworkers
were wanton and reckless by unreasonably disregarding the risk of harm
present to G.B., evidenced by their knowledge of her parents’ history of
abuse and the negative hospital reports provided to them regarding G.B. and
potential parental neglect.50 Upon review, the Court decided that Bradley’s
complaint easily met the requirements necessary for notice-pleading.51
Because of the filed complaint and information provided therein, the Court
stated that the caseworkers were put on adequate notice of the claims being
brought upon them by Bradley and the potential exception to their
immunity.52 Thus, the Court held that a judgement on the pleadings was
inappropriate and cannot be upheld.53 The case was sent back to the lower
court on remand.54
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice DeWine
Justice DeWine wrote the concurring opinion for the case at hand,
joined only by Justice Kennedy. The contents of this concurrence focus
heavily upon its disagreement with the majority’s failure to impose an
alternative pleading standard to notice-pleading.55 The Court begins this
discussion through means of Conley v. Gibson, a United States Supreme
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 10.
Id.; OHIO CIV. R. 9(b) (2022).
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 11; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2022).
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 21-27.
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Court decision which set the standard for notice-pleadings.56 Conley
declares that, for a case to be dismissed at the pleading stage within a
notice-pleading state, a party must prove it is “beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.”57 Otherwise, the case will not be dismissed at that
time.58 The concurring opinion argues that this standard is insufficient and,
furthermore, has long been overruled.59
First, Justice DeWine debates the lack of inclusivity under the “no set of
facts” standard, stating that practically any complaint is able to survive such
a low threshold.60 The concurrence urges that, because the barrier is so low,
the standard is not useful and necessitates being heightened.61 Next, Justice
DeWine draws back to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a United States
Supreme Court decision which postdated and overruled the pleading
standard set forth by Conley.62 Twombly implemented a new standard that
must be met in order for a motion to avoid dismissal in the pleadings
stage.63 Twombly’s rule requires a plaintiff to instead allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”64 Later defined by the
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “plausibility” under Twombly exists when there
is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”65
Justice DeWine argues that, not only does Twombly expressly nullify
notice-pleading as the general standard by overruling Conley, but Ohio
courts have affirmed such time and time again in their subsequent
holdings.66 Thus, through the concurrence, Justice DeWine adamantly
suggests that the Ohio notice-pleading standard applied in the case at bar is
improper and advocates instead for implantation of the Twombly standard
generally.67
The concurrence concludes by applying the current notice-pleading
standard to Bradley’s complaint.68
Taking into account the
undernourishment, injuries, hospital visit, and final cause of death of G.B.,
Justice DeWine agreed with the majority that there are sufficient facts
alleged within the complaint to state a claim for relief under the wanton and
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46
Id.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶¶ 23, 25.
Id.
Id.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶ 29.
Id. at ¶¶ 25-17.
Id at ¶ 30.
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reckless exception to immunity.69 This is because, if the injuries and state
of G.B. were as inexorable as the complaint alleges, one may reasonably
assume a poor home-visit, or no home-visit, was paid to G.B. by the
caseworkers.70 Therefore, the claim may not be dismissed and a motion for
judgement on the pleadings must be denied.71
IV.

ANALYSIS

Perhaps the most intriguing portion of the opinion in the case at bar is
that of Justice DeWine’s concurrence. Brought into question is the
appropriateness of the current notice-pleading standard, which Justice
DeWine attempts to supplant with that of Twombly. By examining the
majority’s use of notice-pleading, and, therefore, Conley, subsequent
questions come into view: Did Twombly simply modify Conley or did it
overrule the latter to create a heightened pleading standard? If Conley was,
in fact, overruled, what impact does that finding have on the legitimacy of
the majority’s holding in this case and other Ohio case law? These two
questions will be discussed in turn.
A. What are the relationships between Twombly, Conley, and Iqbal?
Before much conversation can be had regarding the potential
eradication of Conley by Twombly, both cases must be discussed minimally
in order to analyze the cases’s impacts. Taken chronologically, Conley will
be dealt with first. Prior to Conley, courts and legislature both had been
fervently working to depart from harsh common law pleading standards.72
This effort eventually manifested into the codification of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.73 However, implementation of these new rules did not
come without backlash and confusion of applicability.74 This is where
Conley comes into play. Conley was decided in attempt to clarify operation
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.75 Recall, Federal Rule 8(a)(2) states a general rule for pleadings,
notating that “a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”76 Taking this language, the United States Supreme Court simplifies
69. Id. at ¶ 34.
70. Id.
71. Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096 at ¶¶ 34-35.
72. Jason G. Gottesman, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 977-83 (2008) [hereinafter Gottesman, Speculating as to the
Plausible].
73. Id. at 979.
74. Id. at 979-87.
75. Id. at 985-86.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2022).
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its interpretation through Conley by issuing the notice-pleading standard, an
elaboration on Rule 8(a)(2).77 This standard states, “a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.”78 This “rule” was subsequently applied to all like
cases, without fail, until 2007 when the United States Supreme Court was
faced with the Twombly decision.79
When Twombly entered the scene, there had already been numerous
years of fighting for a heightened pleading standard for many specific
claims.80 In fact, other Rule 8 claims, such as fraud or mistake, came to
adopt such harsher pleading requirements.81 Thus, when the United States
Supreme Court was faced with Twombly, it was no stranger to the idea of
imposing a greater threshold for pleadings.82 Furthermore, Twombly dealt
with antitrust litigation, which was one of the primary claims a heightened
pleading standard was sought for.83 The Twombly Court did not hold back
in eliciting disdain for the “no set of facts” standard in Conley.84 It stated
that the Conley language should be “forgotten” because it was “an
incomplete, negative gloss on [the] accepted pleading standard” of Rule
8(a)(2).85 Instead, the Court suggested that, rather than upholding Conley’s
view which allows any theory of a claim to survive unless facially
impossible, the Court will now require “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”86 However, this concept of “plausibility”
remained somewhat unclear until the United States Supreme Court decision
of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
Iqbal not only brought clarity to the vague idea of “facial plausibility”
but also discerned which claims were to abide by the Twombly standard.87
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court states that, for use under the Twombly standard,
“a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”88 There must be facts alleged which allow the
court to infer, using its common sense, that there was more than simply a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity, supra note 5, at 1245-46.
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity, supra note 5, at 1250.
Id.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id. at 1250-52.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 561, 570.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-84.
Id. at 678.
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possibility the defendant was unlawful.89 The Court then directly states that
this standard, derived from Twombly and Iqbal, applies not only to antitrust
claims but to all civil actions.90
B. Did Twombly overrule Conley to create a heightened pleading
standard?
Now that there is basic understanding of the intertwined past of Conley,
Twombly, and Iqbal, we must determine what their current relationship and
effect is. These topics, however, are the focus of much ongoing debate
amongst the legal community. While many scholars believe Twombly
overruled Conley entirely, others hold belief that the three cases work
harmoniously together to shed light on Rule 8(a)(2).
Scholars of the belief that Twombly has eradicated Conley hinge their
opinion on the idea that Twombly created a new heightened pleading
standard.91 This view primarily comes from the changes that commenced
after both the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. The first of these “changes” is
that of the role of the judge.92 It is argued that, by Iqbal requiring the judge
to use common sense in making inferences about facial plausibility, the
judge must now act as a “skeptical judicial gatekeeper.”93 The argument
continues that giving the judge this role grants him too much power,
allowing the judge to strike down any civil action that seems unlikely to him
rather than basing the merits of the case on testimony or evidence.94 While
scholars are correct that the judge is being asked to make inferential
decisions based on his own thought processes, this ask is not disparate to
that of any other claim brought before him. Judges are impartial parties
who are called to use their “common sense” and legal knowledge to make
judgements on a daily basis; what they are asked to do under Twombly and
Iqbal is no different. Further, the judge’s ability to dismiss the claim on
these grounds is the exception, not the rule; claims proceed unless they are
facially implausible, a standard which, for any meritorious claim, should not
be hard to reach.
The second change looked upon by those who believe Conley has been
overruled is that, as a result of the “heightened standard,” a complainant is
forced to state sufficient facts to satisfy the Twombly standard without first
89. Id. at 664, 678.
90. Id. at 684.
91. Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the
Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 314 (2011) [hereinafter Eaton, The Key
to the Courthouse Door].
92. Id. at 315.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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being allowed discovery.95 However, this is not an unordinary burden for
parties responding to pretrial motions nor is it unique to a Twombly motions
to dismiss. All pretrial motions suffer from this same complex. Further,
even if the burden was unique to Twombly cases, it is not a hard one to
meet. All a plaintiff must do to not get their claim dismissed is state a fact
that shows there is something more than just a possibility the defendant was
unlawful.96 It is “possible” any person walking the planet has acted
contrary to the law; this is an especially broad test. The only action a
plaintiff must take in response is point to any factual basis that has caused
them to believe the defendant actually did something unlawful. This
standard does not ask anything extraordinary of the plaintiff; rather, it
assures there is a meritorious basis for a claim to be brought and avoids
frivolous actions.
Contrary to the aforementioned arguments are those of scholars who
believe Conley was not overruled and that it, instead, acts in compliance
with Twombly and Iqbal. This viewpoint derives from the language of
Twombly and its functionality in practice. First and foremost, proponents of
this view are quick to point out that the Court in Twombly expressly denies
that it created a heightened pleading standard therein.97 Secondly, it is
argued that Twombly was a clarification of Conley rather than a rewrite.98
This argument’s validity has been exemplified on numerous occasions. One
of such was in the United States Supreme Court per curium opinion of
Erickson v. Pardus.99 In Erikson, the Court is direct in stating that Twombly
upholds Conley’s requirements, except that specific facts are no longer
necessary; the only statements required are a claim made and the grounds to
assert it.100 Both Conley and Twombly are generous in their parameters, and
have been found by the Supreme Court to coexist successfully.101 This is
not complicated by Iqbal.102 Though Iqbal elaborates upon Twombly’s
language, neither the meaning of Conley nor Twombly have been implicated
by such; rather, Iqbal stands to flesh out the information already provided
by both of the previous decisions.103 Further, recall the purpose for which
Twombly was decided: to clarify Conley.104 Neither Twombly nor Iqbal
exceeded this purpose; rather, the Court accomplished what it set out to do.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door, supra note 91, at 314-15.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Detterman, Rumors of Conley’s Demise, supra note 1, at 320.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322-23.
Detterman, Rumors of Conley’s Demise, supra note 1, at 322-23.
Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity, supra note 5, at 1250.
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Lastly, the majority of claims made under Conley that occurred before
Twombly remain “good law,” pointing to the conclusion that Conley was not
eradicated by Twombly.105
It is clear these opposing standpoints view the resultant law from
Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal in drastically different lights. The difference is
this: arguments posed by those supporting an idea of an overruled Conley
gathered their viewpoints from hypothetical “issues” that did not exist. In
contrast, those who believe the three cases to work symbiotically base their
findings on the precise language of numerous texts written by the United
States Supreme Court which speak directly to the issue. Additionally, this
second opinion finds itself meritorious given the purpose for which
Twombly was initially brought before the Court. Thus, because the latter
argument has concrete measures of intention and effect, unlike that of the
former, it is likely that the second viewpoint is correct and that the pleading
standard has not been heightened through implication of Twombly and
Iqbal.
C. How does the lack of a new standard impact the case at bar?
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Ohio used the Conley standard
alone to formulate their decision regarding the merits of the case. Like
Justice DeWine, I agree the correct result was reached by the majority;
however, the methodology in which it came about was amiss. As analyzed
above, neither Twombly nor Iqbal created a heightened pleading standard to
that of Conley. Rather, the three cases work as one to interpret and
appropriately implement Rule 8(a)(2). By the Supreme Court of Ohio
utilizing only the Conley requirements that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff [cannot] prove . . . [a] claim which would entitle him to relief,” it
failed to adequately analyze how such “proof” must be made.106 This proof
does not come from the “no set of facts” rule Conley suggests, but rather
from stating “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”107 This is the manner in which this trio of cases must be applied: a
comprehensive unit, not enemies at battle.
However, if the Court had appropriately applied all three cases to the
instant case, it would have reached the same result and denied the motion to
dismiss. This is because the facts alleged by Bradley in her complaint
regarding the caseworker’s behavior and the pathetic state of G.B. before
and at the time of her death reveal an inference can be made, using common
105. Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door, supra note 91, at 317.
106. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
107. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 570.
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sense, to determine it was more than just possible the caseworkers acted
wantonly and recklessly regarding G.B.’s case. Thus, because applying the
appropriate standard reaches the same result as the majority opinion, I
respectfully concur with the majority in judgement only.
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s flawed reasoning in reaching
that judgement manifests the potential for future cases to be decided
incorrectly. If only the Conley standard is applied, the Court not only
neglects the precents of both Twombly and Iqbal but will also incorrectly
use the “no set of facts” rule present in Conley that was removed by
Twombly. Therefore, despite the appropriate outcome being met in the
instant case, the Court’s failure to appropriately apply the law in this case
may have mass, negative impacts on future Ohio caselaw. Erratic
implementation of state laws has long been taboo, as mandated by the
persuasive doctrine of stare decisis, Ohio’s own constitutional provision,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.108 Regarding the particular rule in question, a great
need for its systematic enforcement has also been proven by the United
States Supreme Court clarifying its intended application of the rule on three
separate occasions.109 It is clear, given the aforementioned legal principles
and precedent, that nonuniform application of this law would divest Ohio
citizens seeking a claim under Rule 8(a)(2) of the equality and due process
rights they are owed.110 Because the Conley standard, used in the case
herein, is inartful in its representation of the intention for the rule’s
operation, possibilities of its misuse and nonuniform application are endless.
A state Supreme Court seated with justices who disagree on the correct
implementation and relationship between Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal will
undoubtedly deliver contradictory applications of the law, especially as new
justices step into the Court. Viewed in tension with one another, the three
instrumental cases herein cannot lead to equal application of the law.
However, if the suggested uniform approach is adopted, disproportionate
treatment of Rule 8(a)(2) claims will disappear; thus, ratification of this
view is vital for the Ohio court system to protect the equality and
constitutional rights it owes its citizens.111
Lastly, it may be argued that neither Conley, Twombly, nor Iqbal are
appropriately applied in the case at bar because they deal with a motion for
summary judgement whereas the case at bar presents a 12(c) motion to
dismiss. However, the Sixth Circuit has set precedent which allows Conley,
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (2022); OHIO CONST. art. II § 26 (2022); In re Tong Seng Vue,
364 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007).
109. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. OHIO CONST. art. II § 26 (2022); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (2022).
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Twombly, and Iqbal caselaw to be applied to 12(c) motions.112 Therefore,
the law is correctly applied in the case at hand.
V.

CONCLUSION

Two primary questions were sought to be answered in the form of this
case note: (1) Did Twombly and Iqbal overrule Conley by creating a
heightened pleading standard, and (2) What is the impact of the answer of
the first question on the case at bar? To address the answer to the first
point, it was necessary to understand the past and current relationships of
the trio of cases. Each of these precedents were produced as a means to
clarify the one prior, not to displace it. Thus, in action, it only makes sense
that the three cases be used harmoniously rather than to combat one another.
Therefore, when a court approaches a Rule 8(a)(2) problem, they must
begin with the Conley standard and work towards Iqbal. In unison, these
cases set the rule as follows: a complaint may only be dismissed if it
appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is incapable of stating sufficient facts
to claim relief; these facts must be facially plausible so that a judge, using
their common sense, may reasonably draw an inference that the defendant
was acting unlawfully.113 This is the combined standard produced by the
three cases.
The Supreme Court of Ohio failed to apply this standard in the case at
bar. If it had, however, the judgment would come out all the same. This is
because both the majority’s use of Conley and the combined standard look
to the facts alleged in Bradley’s complaint. The malnourished state of G.B.
in addition to both the hospital’s and coroner’s reports mentioned in the
complaint are more than sufficient facts to allow a judge to reasonably draw
the inference that the defendant caseworkers were acting wantonly and
recklessly, and, therefore, unlawfully. Though the reasoning by which the
judgment was reached by vastly differs between the majority and the
combined standard, the facts of this case allow a similar judgment to be
made in both circumstances. Thus, under the combined standard, the case
would be remanded to the lower court for a decision consistent with this
ruling.
ALYSSA MILLER

112. Lemasters v. The Celina Municipal Court, et al. (memo), 2015-Ohio-2102 (2015); Tucker v.
Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008).
113. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664, 678.
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